Dissecting a Cyber Attack With a Perspective on Compliance

A website breach

We recently came across an interesting case with one of our EAP (Early Access Program) customers, whose website was compromised. This site, hosted on GCP (Google Cloud Platform), was breached, and the first warning sign was a notification from GCP about anomalous egress traffic from the virtual machine (VM) running their website. The very next day, GCP took swift action, isolating the affected instance and notifying the customer. As we later realized during our analysis, many of the gaps that led to this breach could have been addressed through a structured ISO 27001 incident response and incident management approach, something this incident would highlight in depth.

As part of the EAP program for CISOGenie, we were in regular touch with them. They were already aware of the team’s strong cybersecurity background, including experience at companies like McAfee, Sophos, and Netskope. They reached out to us and asked if we could do an initial investigation. The CISOGenie team investigated the incident and uncovered several interesting findings.

Top priority: Service Restoration

For any SMB, their website remaining inaccessible for a prolonged period is a huge problem, a definite ‘no-no’ that can result in significant reputational damage. So, the first order of business was clear: to get the site back up. The CISOGenie team helped respond to GCP. We responded to GCP that the VM would be equipped with latest anti-malware software and regular updates. Additionally, we committed to blocking all egress traffic, except port 53 (for DNS), from that VM. With those assurances, GCP restored access to that VM. The website was up, and it was business as usual. Or so it appeared…

One-time redirection, A clue easily overlooked

After the website was restored, our customer noticed something odd, though they didn’t take it seriously at first. When someone accessed their site, it would sometimes redirect to a completely different, unrelated website, which incidentally returned an HTTP 500 error. They also mentioned this happened only once, no immediate red flags.

As we began analyzing this symptom, it quickly became clear why the redirection was a one-off event — a cookie was being set. The redirect to the suspected malicious site (which returned an HTTP 500 error) only occurred if that cookie wasn’t present. From the browser’s Developer Console, we deduced this was a JavaScript-based redirection. Specifically, one of the JavaScript files loaded by the website made a GET request for another JavaScript file, and that request returned an HTTP 302, sending users to the unrelated site.

However, their team that works on the website said they had not made any changes that would result in such a behavior.

Digging Deep and Tracing the attack origin

With the site back online, it was time to peel back the layers and understand exactly what happened. Our initial discussions with the customer revealed a crucial detail: they had updated about eight WordPress plugins the previous day. This immediately raised a red flag.

When we performed our basic cyber forensics, what we uncovered was a bit alarming:

1. A Hidden Command-and-Control (C2) Binary: Tucked deep within the WordPress folder structure was a mysterious binary. This looked exactly like a C2 client, designed to communicate with a remote server. This was the source of the anomalous egress traffic that GCP had flagged, attempting to “phone home” to an xmlrpc.php file on a remote IP address.
2. Over 1,000 Modified JavaScript Files: Almost every JavaScript file across the site had been altered. The very first line of each file was prefixed with an obfuscated JavaScript snippet. This was the malicious code responsible for the one-time redirection and setting that suspicious cookie we observed earlier.
3. A WebShell from “ALFA TEaM”: We also discovered a brand-new file, update-lol.php, which contained an embedded WebShell. This WebShell is attributed to a group known as “ALFA TEaM,” widely suspected to be an Iranian threat group.

Our analysis strongly suggested that the C2 binary was directly responsible for modifying these JavaScript files.If a proper ISO 27001 incident responseplan had been implemented, this would have triggered alerts immediately after the initial compromise, significantly reducing dwell time.

Likely Attack Sequence

1. Several WordPress plugins were updated.
2. One or more of them were infected, resulting in a Supply-chain attack (all 8 of those plugins had an update again within the next 4–5 days)
3. When that plugin was updated, it installed the binary that acted as the C2 client.
4. The binary spoke to a remote malicious server.
5. The remote server gave a “Command” to infect (i.e., modify) all JS files with a prefix. The prefix would have also come from the C2 server.
6. The binary changed 1000+ JS files in the WordPress folder.
7. As a separate C2 request-response, it would have also got the update-log.php (suspecting this because the JS files modification timestamp and the timestamp on this file were exactly 6 hours apart)

Governance, Risk & Compliance

You might be thinking, “Okay, CISOGenie is a GRC company, so of course, they’re going to talk about GRC.” And you’d be right, partly! But we’re not bringing this up just because it’s our domain. There’s a common misconception that compliance standards and frameworks are simply boxes to tick, a regulatory burden rather than practical tools for real-world safety.

Let’s challenge that idea. This entire incident, from the initial breach to the deep investigation, could have been either significantly mitigated or even entirely avoided with a strict adherence to a framework like ISO 27001:2022.

And that’s where ISO 27001 incident management becomes invaluable. This framework doesn’t just focus on documentationit lays out structured, tested, and regularly reviewed procedures for identifying, reporting, assessing, and responding to security events.

The table below illustrates how specific controls from ISO 27001:2022 directly address the issues our customer faced, showing both the control text and how CISOGenie’s platform helps implement them through actionable tasks.

How could ISO 27001 incident response controls have prevented this

1. Installing IDS/IPS would have discovered and blocked the CnC attack. It would have also blocked the modified JS if the IPS signatures are updated regularly.
2. Web Filter of requests going from the network would have detected and alerted the network/security team to the anomalous communication and the binary that was received in response.
3. Deployment of anti-malware would have also blocked the execution of the said binary that modified the JS scripts (A lookup of the SHA256 in VirusTotal shows about 40 AV vendors having that signature in their DATs)

The Takeaway: Compliance is not paperwork, it is protection

This incident is a powerful reminder that security frameworks like ISO 27001 are not theoretical, they’re practical guides to real-world risk reduction.

Had proper ISO 27001 incident management been embedded into their processes, our customer could have:

• Prevented the compromise entirely.
• aDetected it significantly faster.
• Limited the damage drastically.

It’s clear: compliance done right is cybersecurity done right. It’s not about jumping through hoops; it’s about building resilience.

Ready to strengthen your defenses and achieve real protection through smart compliance?

Reach out to us to learn more about CISOGenie, the first Agentic GRC platform.